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All organizations confront the possibility of scandal; however, the
reputational threat caused by scandal is exacerbated when these events
are not properly addressed. Since scandals also have the potential to
adversely affect organizational personnel, dilemmas arise regarding
traditional ideas of employee agency. In this study, we conduct an
experiment manipulating the severity of the reputational threat and its
financial consequences for decision-makers, using actual corporate
officers and internal auditors. One key question is this: “Are corporate
decision-makers’ responses to potential scandals affected by whether
they, as incentivized individuals (via stock options), have “skin in the
game?” Findings indicate that corporate personnel believe corporations
should respond aggressively to scandals having potential reputational
consequences; however, they prefer not to proactively respond to
reputational threats when expected personal gains are likely to be
jeopardized. Internal auditors, by contrast, are less sensitive to
personal gains. An archival supplementary analysis supports these
findings by suggesting that equity compensation was 17.7% higher
before a severe reputational event.
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business decision-makers make a potentially
dangerous situation worse by failing to address the
problem proactively and with the appropriate degree
of transparency. The correct response may be
difficult to formulate, in part because decision-

1. INTRODUCTION
Business history includes a plethora of instances
where an organization is confronted with a situation
that threatens a severe reputational injury. Often
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makers do not possess all the information about
what occurred. They cannot clearly foresee how
stakeholders will react to such dynamic situations,
and the correct responses can often only be seen in
retrospect.
Modern organizations are complex entities, and
much of what needs to be done falls on relatively
low-level actors (Uhl-Bien & Arena, 2017). Specialized
expertise or critical positioning necessitates the
exercise of discretion. On some occasions, such
judgments are not in the interests of the entire
organization, especially as they attempt to navigate
in harmony with the public interest. Lower-level
agents also possess an idiosyncratic time horizon
that favors actions featuring short-term advantages
over those with the potential to work to the
organization’s long-terms advantage (Shaikh, Drira,
& Hassine, 2019). Intentionally, our material explores
the factors and consequences of such idiosyncratic
behavior.
When questionable actions have been taken by
and on behalf of an organization, higher-level
officers possess a range of possible responses.
These options vary in their capacity to correct the
situation and its likely consequences; accordingly,
the options present a set of potential costs to
managers. Typically, more aggressive treatments will
involve much more expense than options that
implicitly suggest the problem is minor and unlikely
to result in serious negative consequences.
For many years, research literature has focused
on the fact that executive compensation has been
based on the notion of goal congruence: corporate
officials are best motivated when they are
compensated in alignment with corporate results
(Eisenhartd, 1989). When key decision-makers stand
to share in the good fortune of the company they
manage, they are thought to maximize shareholder
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen &
Murphy,
1990).
However,
these
axiomatic
assumptions may cloud how officials react to
reputationally sensitive events. Choices that are
costly in the short run may be less favored if their
use has significantly negative personal wealth
consequences for decision-makers. In other words,
doing the right things may be more difficult when it
cannot be done entirely with other people’s money.
Because of the tremendous complexity involved
in executive compensation and the mechanisms
used to maximize investor wealth, this bias may
negatively affect the efficacy of equity-based
instruments. This is mainly because stock-based
compensation creates controversy in the academic
arena: for example, offering shares to executives
promotes risk-sharing alongside shareholders and
helps maximize overall organizational performance.
This alleviates some agency problems (Eisenhardt,
1989) and prevents over-focusing on short-term
revenue growth. Also, executives are financially
stimulated to maximize their own interest and,
conversely, investors’ interest (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, &
Dalton, 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Besides
these two major benefits, a number of scholars have
found that such compensation mechanisms yield
other benefits, especially for executives working in
capital markets (Certo, Daily, Cannella, & Dalton,
2003; Core & Larcker, 2002; Mehran, 1995; Yermack,
1997).

In contrast to all suggested benefits, scholars
have also noted negative behavioral consequences
associated with using equity-based compensation.
Because of the compensation design, executives earn
economic benefits when prices increase; however,
they do not fully participate in losses when stock
prices decrease below a given price threshold. Under
these agreements, executives are inclined to take
greater risks (with resulting extreme gains or losses)
with the anticipation that their losses will be limited
(Martin, Wiseman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2019; Sanders,
2001; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). Another finding
suggests that the risk of fraudulent behavior by
executives to manipulate unhealthy earnings
(Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006) may increase as the
end of the stock-option period approaches
(O’Connor, Priem, Coombs, & Gilley, 2006).
To address this controversy, the primary goal is
to understand the reputational consequences of
using equity-based compensation for executives
responsible for the risk-decision process. This is
achieved by extending the risk-taking behavioral
models that arise as a consequence of aligning
incentives using stock options (Connelly, Lee,
Tihanyi, Certo, & Johnson, 2019; Martin, Wiseman, &
Gomez-Mejia, 2019; Lovelace, Bundy, Hambrick, &
Pollock, 2018). This research is primarily concerned
with the impact of equity-based incentive
compensation mechanisms on executives’ responses
to scandals.
The applied methodology consists of a realistic
simulation based on a risk-bearing decision with
potential reputational consequences. In addition to
possible manipulation of the compensation received,
research also focuses on the magnitude of the
reputational threat facing the company. This is
predicated on the belief that decision-makers are
able to calibrate their actions to the demands of the
events they face, and that there can indeed be a
correlation between total compensation and event
severity.
Not all corporate decision-makers are equal.
For these purposes, two groups can be
distinguished.
Most
prominently,
high-level
executives with a great degree of control over
corporate direction tend to be directly compensated
for corporate performance, but have jobs not limited
to risk management (Agle et al., 1999). In contrast to
those individuals, internal auditors tend to be more
focused on protecting the company, but are less
likely to have performance-based compensation
(Dezoort et al., 2000). By using both of these groups,
the research assesses whether corporate position
matters to the decision at hand.
Anticipating the main conclusions to be drawn,
the research findings indicate that the equity-based
compensation covered in the agency theory
literature may not work as expected in the effort to
safeguard the reputation of companies. This is a
consequence of executives’ mindset that expected
economic goals should be achieved regardless of the
reputational components in the decision-making
process. To some extent, stock compensation
operates well in aligning incentives to maximizing
shareholders’ value, but its effects can be restricted
in the reputational risk-bearing arena.
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2. LITERATURE
DEVELOPMENT

REVIEW

AND

functioning well, threats are contained, allowing
higher-level corporate officers to ignore the
specifics. At other times, discrete involvement by
higher-level agents becomes necessary. Decisionmakers’ attention can be required even if the
outcome they select is to ignore the situation and to
take no action at the present time. In this process,
they have to deal with the unknown, and probably
understated, cost of containment as well as the
reaction of external parties. The objective is to
prevent a scandal from developing since scandals
involve ballooning costs and snowballing reactions
by others.
Aside from the profit-protective attitude, it is
expected that reputational threats will be evaluated
based on severity. There is a tendency to maintain
business future stability as part of the expected
managers’ capabilities (Shaikh et al., 2019). The
preventive response should be based on risk
categorization. People with experience with
corporate risks should be expected to react with
more forcefulness to threats that are more likely to
happen, are more important to critical stakeholders
and the media, and involve possible damage to
important areas of ongoing business. This
interaction expectation is captured by the following
hypothesis.
H1: Corporate personnel will support more
proactive scandal responses when the company is
confronted with more severe threat situations.
H1 posits a “rational” reaction in which the
response matches the stimulus in degree; however,
other elements may enter into decision-making.
Spending
shareholder
resources
(perhaps
extravagantly) in a conservative effort to minimize
risk and avoid embarrassing scandals at all costs
might be a viable strategy. However, such a posture
might be tempered by its projected impact upon an
individual’s personal wealth. Corporate officers with
large holdings of company stock may realize that
their personal wealth will be adversely affected by
threat reactions that are inordinately expensive.
When they realize that they are, at least in part,
spending their own money, they may pursue less
expensive strategies to deal with reputational
threats. In doing so, they essentially exhibit greater
willingness to take the risk that their response may
not be adequate for the threat involved.
H2: Corporate personnel will support less
proactive scandal responses when confronted with
potentially greater personal financial losses.
If we believe that corporate officials take their
professional duties very seriously, the interrelationship between H1 and H2 becomes apparent.
The
qualitative
difference
between
severe
organization-jeopardizing events and others may be
so prominent that they alter how readily decisionmakers allow themselves to think about personal
wealth consequences. With less at stake, a more
balanced set of factors may come into play, allowing
methods of compensation to be more salient.
H3: When scandal threats faced by an
organization are more severe, the degree of potential
personal financial losses will be less consequential in
determining the level of corporate response.
Top executives are not the only participants
engaged in the risk management process: internal
auditors are effectively charged with protecting the
organization, often from itself. These individuals are

HYPOTHESIS

Creating a conceptual framework for understanding
executive behavior is a complex task (Kole, 1997). To
mitigate arguments about the behavioral factors
involved, the theoretical background focuses on
models of agent-principal conflicts as they pertain to
incentives and behavioral decision-making processes
which determine how organizations address risk and
uncertainty. The agency theory explores the
correlation between managers’ behavior and the
interests of the institution, largely through the prism
of organizational incentives. Specifically, this theory
evaluates the consequences of incentives/objectives
that are not identical or symmetrical (Fama & Jensen,
1983a, 1983b). Essentially, the problem is that
managers may not share the owners’ desire to
maximize returns; therefore, systems must be
established to control or monitor agent behavior.
Once proper economic motivations are in place,
behavioral
decision-making
models
facilitate
understanding how corporate personnel react in a
prospective money-base environment.
In the agency theoretical realm, stock-based
compensation has been a common means of aligning
agent incentives with those of shareholders (Jensen
& Murphy, 1990). Through share ownership, often
made available through stock option arrangements,
executives participate in the wealth creation of
corporate activities and bear similar risks in its
production (Hall & Murphy, 2000; Liljeblom et al.,
2011). Unfortunately, agents with company stock are
less able to diversify their portfolios and, therefore,
are greatly affected by company stock price
downturns for shares already held (French &
Poterba, 1991; Goetzmann & Kuman, 2008). On the
other hand, company executives suffer no actual
wealth diminishment for stock price declines on
stock options not yet exercised. Consequently, the
instrument design imposes intrinsic contractual
limitations on managerial personnel participating in
the gains as investors.
Restrictions inherent in equity compensation
intensify executives’ risk tolerance and, conversely,
the extent to which their firms are exposed to risk.
In agreements designed by the executives, risk
exposure is accentuated (Conrad, 2015). This occurs
largely because managerial decisions lean toward an
“expected profit-protection attitude” intended to
improve future stock performance (Shi, Connelly,
Mackey, & Gupta, 2019).
In terms of assuring prospective equity
performance, executives manifest lower riskprevention attitudes. For example, share-price
contracts discourage whistleblowing (Rose, Brink, &
Norman, 2018). Expected profit-protection raises the
level of certain risks, including reputational risk.
Hence, shares-based mechanisms also encourage
unanticipated risk scenarios involving agents who
expect future gains.
Companies exist in a world where many things
could go wrong and cause them to suffer
reputational losses. Most of these events have a low
probability of occurrence; in addition, some can be
readily mitigated by routine corrective action.
Therefore, reputational threats do not always
become reputational scandals. If systems are
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less likely than top executives to have equity-based
compensation, and are perhaps purposefully trained
to be very conservative in their orientation toward
risk. The relative amount of “skin in the game” can
be seen as making it difficult to see the full
magnitude of the potential threat. Having two
groups in the mix of decision-makers enables
empirical questioning based on differences in
organizational position. This yields the following
two-fold hypothesis.
H4a: High-level corporate executives’ support
for scandal decisions will be more influenced by
potential personal financial losses than will internal
auditors’ support for those decisions.
H4b: Internal auditors’ support for scandal
decisions will be more influenced by relative severity
than will corporate executives’ support for those
decisions.
The scope of research into these phenomena is
somewhat ambitious. Two factors can
be
manipulated, one of which is more obviously
rational than the other. People should respond in
proportion to the scale of threats if they are to do
their best to protect their organizations. However,
the personal financial consequences of doing so
must be considered in the current regime of equity
compensation for corporate personnel. How
individuals balance these objectives may be related
to their current organizational capacity.

Reputational threats from the revelation of
scandalous facts can occur at any point during a
product life cycle; however, the introduction of a
new product seems to be a uniquely sensitive
moment. Despite vigorous pre-testing of new
products before their launch, the release of
something new into the market can be seen as a
much broader challenge for product functionality
and safety; therefore, concerns about new products
form a large part of the reputational risk faced by a
company. This sensitivity is especially pronounced
in the pharmaceutical industry because new drugs
can sometimes produce unpredictable reactions
(Allen, 1984). In this industry, the inadvertent harm
done can be enormous in magnitude, and simple
recalls of the product are not always very effective.
Pharmaceuticals are heavily regulated in most
countries, but the burden imposed by such
regulation varies by country (Chen, 2015).
Subjects were given a hypothetical scenario
involving a hair-growing pill intended to remedy
male pattern baldness. Reports of unpleasant side
effects were made following the initial sales of the
drug in a regulatory market that is more flexible
than in the United States. Subjects were asked for
their
reaction
to
a
Board
of
Directors’
recommendation that one of three levels of action
(total recall, partial recall, no recall) be implemented.
The health repercussions of the news served as the
first manipulated variable. Two levels of severity
involving the qualitative degree of unpleasantness
and the likelihood of occurrence were applied. The
high-severity case involved a combination of
reduced sexual performance, nausea, headaches, and
somnolence for one of every six users. The lowseverity case involved poor drug effectiveness in one
of twenty cases.
Participants were asked to indicate a level of
support for a decision, rather than to make a
decision, in deference to the observation that
responses to reputational threats are typically group
decisions made at the highest level of corporate
governance. In other words, supporting the decision
of someone with more responsibility and power
within the company is closer to the actual
involvement of the participants. This design features
also reduces the degree to which the decision might
be influenced by espoused ethics or social
desirability.
Because subjects were hypothetically vested
with wealth positions constituting a large and
growing block of company stock, the expected
decline in value of the corporate stock was designed
as an index to that sensitivity to the potential for
personal financial loss. Decreases in stock price of
22.5%, 7.5%, and 0% were used to distinguish levels
of financial loss that would accompany a total recall
of the product, a partial recall, or no recall
respectively. The manipulations of threat severity
and expected economic consequences were meant to
provide data to test H1 – H3.
The test of H4 is accommodated by the nature
of the respondents. Approximately half the
respondents were “C-suite” corporate executives; the
other half were internal auditors. This made a
formal consideration of occupational group
differences possible: corporate positions had not
been assigned to participants, but instead were
stated as attributes they possessed, so it need not be

3. METHODOLOGY
There is a central challenge embedded in studying
individuals’ behavior as they weigh the risk of
reputational events that have not yet occurred:
conceptually modeling uniform settings that a
certain person would perform given certain
conditions. This study meets that challenge by
explaining the research methodology and, in
addition, the motivation and details behind
simulating a reality-based problem that participants
might face. Then, as necessitated by certain
observed characteristics, there is a description of the
administering process used to collect responses,
followed by an analysis of the target group and the
differentiating process. Lastly, a supplementary
section in the research design, intended to enhance
the quality of the findings, is explained. The
objective of this addendum is to explain how the
challenges of inquiring about individuals’ responses
to a hypothetical problem are overcome.
Completion of a successful study required
thorough control over data regarding corporate
practices
and
reputation-threatening
events.
Rigorous control over the great variety of corporate
practices and threatening events was necessary to
achieve. This precluded the use of a survey since the
differing relevant environments of practice could
never be sufficiently captured. An experimental
approach was taken to achieve some degree of
homogeneity and simplification, and as a way to
reduce the sensitivity and confidentiality problems
involved in making inquiries into actual situations
(Ashton & Kramer, 1980; Gibbings & Salterio, 1996;
Smith, 2014). Given the basic nature of the
hypothesis involved, we believed that effective
hypothetical manipulations could be designed and
administered.
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considered part of the experimental design. Since
the distinction involved in H4 is a partition, the cell
array should be considered a 2x3 composed of
threat severity (within-subjects) and personal
economic loss potential (between-subjects).
Manipulation checks established that subjects
understood the undesirability of the early product
performance results on human health, and of the
lack of desired effectiveness results attributed to the
product. They also understood the relative financial
costs of the three choices available to the board of
directors.
Subjects were recruited for the experiments by
one of the authors, aided by contacts made for a
previous project involving “C-Suite” executives by
that author. Internal auditor participation was
facilitated by an endorsement by the Institute of
Internal Auditors. We sought a sample as equally
divided across the two groups as possible. Obtaining
subjects whose work positions did involve responses
to reputational threats was typical was critical to the
research (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014).
The instrument was delivered through the
internet using Qualtrics to control the order of cues
seen by the subjects. Each subject saw two scenarios
involving both the low- and the high-severity
situations. For both, subjects were asked to assume
their current capacity by for a hypothetical
pharmaceutical company with a new hair loss
product. Subjects were hypothetically vested with a
compensation package that included stock options
with significant past gains.
Supplementary analysis enriches the research
methodology. The central hypothesis refers to the
managerial reaction to uncertainty facing unknown
reputational consequences and potential personal
losses. To validate the findings, an additional
segment tests archival data from known events and
the differences with a peer group without such data.
The collected data contains archives relative to the
recall of 164 Class I life-threatening drugs from
2012 to 2017 by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). This is because life-threatening products have
high media coverage and negative financial impact
over organizations (Chen, Ganesan, & Liu, 2009;
Baucus & Baucus, 2009). From this sample group, we
gathered the pre-event stock option CEOs’
compensations. Once the gathering process was
completed, a similarly sized sample of peer
companies (164 cases) compares the executives’

compensations of both groups. The comparison is
run using a non-parametric ANOVA test. The overall
intention pursues not only instrument validity but
also the robustness of the theoretical hypothesis.
Stock options compensation was obtained from
Compustat Execucomp. Consequently, recallingfirms represent the high-risk scenario, the control
group, the low reputational risk, and the
compensation, the economic component.

4. RESULTS
The 180 participants were composed of 71 females
(39%) and 109 males (61%). The average experience
of members of the group was more than 16 years of
work, and over 62% of the participants held a
professional certification. An equal number of
participants (90) were in the high-level corporate
executive group and in the internal audit group. The
internal auditors were more heavily female than the
executives (46% compared to 33%), but were almost
as experienced (15 years versus 17 years). As
expected the executive were less likely to be
credentialed (36% compared to 89%).
Overall, the respondents supported (agreed or
strongly agreed on a five-point Likert scale) with the
decision made by the Board of Directors in 46% of
the instances. This varies from 47% regarding the
more severe reputational threat case to 44% in the
less extreme scenario. The executives tended to
agree less often than the internal auditors in both
the extreme (38% compared to 57%) and the less
extreme instances (33% compared to 54%). For both
scenarios, agreement was more common than strong
disagreement, but there were no significant
differences across these two response categories for
either participant group. Along similar lines, strong
disagreement was relatively rare, reaching a high of
17% for the executive group in the less extreme case.
H1 studied the main effect of severity. We
anticipated that the respondents as a group would
more likely fall into line with the board of directors’
decision regarding the scenario that presented a
greater reputational threat. Table 1 details the
results of this main effect. Means of 2.93 for the
first scenario (involving serious problems) and 3.00
for the second (involving less serious ones) were
produced. These were not significantly different at
the p<.05 level; thus, no support existed for H1.

Table 1. Corporate personnel responses to the severity of the reputational threat (low – high)
Panel A. Descriptive statistics
SD
N
Severity – Low
1.398
164
Severity – High
1.364
146
Panel B. Homogeneity
Levene’s
F
Based on Mean
0.076
0.783
Based on Median
0.038
0.843
Panel C. Main effects
df
MS
F
Intercept
1
1584.2
830.3
Severity – H1 (Low – High)
1
0.2
0.105
Error
178
1.908
Note: * Bold numbers with significant statistical p-values <.001, <.01, and <.05
Mean
2.30
1.93
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P-value
<.001
0.746

ηp 2
0.823
0.001
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Table 2 involved the impact of personal
financial losses due to the fall in stock value
precipitated by a recall action. H2 expected that the
severity of such losses would be inversely correlated
with the magnitude of support for an extreme
corporate reaction (that also would be the most
expensive option available). The results confirm

support for the expected effect. Participants tend to
lessen their support for the board of directors’
position when they have information about a large
reduction of stock value as a result. The difference
in means is significant at p<.05.

Table 2. Corporate personnel responses’ main effects: personal economic losses
Panel A. Descriptive statistics
SD
N
Economic Losses of 22.5%
1.287
60
Economic Losses of 7.5%
1.125
60
Economic Losses of 0%
1.436
60
Panel B. Homogeneity
Levene’s
F (2/177)
<.05
Based on Mean
3.435
Based on Median
2.742
0.067
Panel C. Main effects
df
MS
F
Intercept
1
1584.2
953.5
Economic Losses – H2
2
22.9
13.8
Error
177
1.661
Note: * Bold numbers with significant statistical p-values <.001, <.01, and <.05
Mean
2.27
3.43
3.20

H3 is an interaction involving the two main
effects of the first two hypotheses. Here the
expectation is that the severity of the event will

p-value
<.001
<.001

ηp 2
0.843
0.135

change the impact of the financial loss on support
for the board’s decision. Table 3 details the tests of
this expectation.

Table 3. Main interaction effects of executives’ responses
Panel A. Descriptive statistics
Severity – Low
Severity – High
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
Economic Losses – 22.5%
2.23
1.305
30
2.30
1.291
Economic Losses – 7.5%
2.67
0.884
30
4.20
0.761
Economic Losses – No
4.10
1.242
30
2.30
0.988
Total
3.00
1.398
90
2.93
1.364
Panel B. Homogeneity
Levene’s
F (5/174)
<.05
Based on Mean
2.315
Based on Median
1.215
0.287
Panel C. Main interaction effects
ηp 2
df
MS
F
p-value
<.001
Intercept
1
1584.2
1312
0.883
<.001
Economic Losses
2
22.9
18.9
0.179
Severity (Low – High)
1
0.200
0.1656
0.685
0.001
Economic Losses x Severity – H3
<.001
2
41.9
34.668
0.285
Error
174
1.2
Note: * Bold numbers with significant statistical p-values <.001, <.01, and <.05

As anticipated by our interaction hypothesis,
the relative severity of the corporate scandal creates
a different environment for assessing the impact of
personal financial losses incurred by participants.
When severity is high, participants are less willing to
accept personal losses (M = 2.3, SD = 1.291), even if
this
means
questioning
the
board’s
recommendations. This effect is significant at the
p<.05 level and provides support for H3. Along
similar lines, one can say that lower severity allows
participants the opportunity to bear their financial
losses when given the opportunity to support or
question the board.
The final hypotheses pertain to group
differences in sensitivity to the two manipulations.
We expected that corporate executives would be
more influenced by their potential financial losses

N
30
30
30
90

Mean
2.27
3.43
3.20
2.97

Total
SD
1.287
1.125
1.436
1.378

N
60
60
60
180

and less by the severity of the scandal. On the other
side of the same coin, we expected that auditors
would be less influenced by personal financial
losses, and would respond more strongly to the
severity of the situation. The results show that
occupational group differences are quite salient in
the economic perspective. As summarized in Table
4, internal auditors much more readily agree to a full
and costly product recall (M = 4.28, SD = 0.976) than
did the executives (M = 2.27, SD = 1.287). Less
extreme actions recommended by the board did not
exhibit such sharp group disagreement. This first
difference (significant at p<.01) supports H4a.
Instead, threat severity was roughly equivalently
evaluated as important by both groups (p>.05); thus,
H4b is not supported.
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Table 4. Between corporate roles: responses’ main effects
Panel A. Descriptive statistics
Executives
Internal auditors
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Economic Losses – 22.5%
2.27
1.287
60
4.28
0.976
60
Economic Losses – 7.5%
3.43
1.125
60
3.43
1.212
60
Economic Losses – No
3.20
1.436
60
2.67
1.548
60
Total
2.97
1.378
180
3.46
1.424
180
Severity – Low
3.00
1.398
90
3.59
1.253
90
Severity – High
2.93
1.364
90
3.33
1.572
90
Total
2.97
1.378
180
3.46
1.424
180
Panel B. Main interaction effects – Economic losses
ηp 2
df
MS
F
p-value
<.001
Intercept
1
3718.5
2276.2
0.865
<.001
Role (Executives – Internal auditors)
1
22.0
13.5
0.037
<.01
Economic Losses
2
7.8
4.8
0.026
Roles x Economic Losses – H4a
<.001
2
54.3
33.2
0.158
Error
354
1.2
Panel C. Main interaction effects – Severity (Low – High)
ηp 2
df
MS
F
p-value
<.001
Intercept
1
3718.5
1892.8
0.842
<.001
Role (Executives – Internal auditors)
1
22.0
11.2
0.031
Severity (Low – High)
1
2.3
1.2
0.276
0.003
Roles x Severity (Low – High) – H4b
1
0.8
0.4
0.523
0.001
Error
356
2.0
Note: * Bold numbers with significant statistical p-values <.001, <.01, and <.05

As stated in the methodology, a supplementary
analysis enriches the quality of the findings. Because
the experimental instrument simulates a realitybased scenario, we test the reliability of the
instrument and the findings using feasible data from
FDA archives and the executives’ compensation.
Using an ANOVA test, findings suggest that on
average executives whose companies recall their
products end up with 17.7% higher values in their
stock option compensation before the event (p<.05).

Mean
3.28
3.43
2.93
3.21
3.29
3.13
3.21

Total
SD
1.523
1.165
1.510
1.421
1.357
1.481
1.421

N
120
120
120
360
180
180
360

The mean of executives’ compensation before the
scandal rose to 2.3 million dollars (SD = .8), while in
the control group the mean ascended to $1.9 million
on average. Therefore, this information enriches the
consistency hypothesis: executives who have higher
compensation engage in more risk-taking behaviors
which could potentially lead to negative reputational
events. Table 5 details these findings.

Table 5. Executives’ compensations before recall vs. no recall
Panel A. Descriptive statistics
SD
N
Recall
1.398
90
No Recall
1.364
90
Panel B. Homogeneity
Levene’s
F
Based on Mean
23.2
<.001
Based on Median
13.9
<.001
Panel C. Main effects
df
MS
F
Intercept
1
11229
79.8
Recall
1
2474
17.6
308
14062
Note: * Bold numbers with significant statistical p-values <.001, <.01, and <.05
Mean
3.00
2.93

P-value
<.001
<.001

ηp 2
.206
.054

similar event, financial personal losses were
irrelevant). It can be inferred that, when the main
agents’ driver is the protection of personal profits,
the likelihood of reputational scandals increases,
compromising the expected “skin in the game”
aspect. As a theoretical inquiry into the factors that
promote major reputational events, the research
contributes to the academic literature regarding the
inherent limitations (such as executives’ capital loss
exclusions) observed as a result of equity-based
contracts. The researchers theorized that managerial
responses contain
an
idiosyncratic
element
(expected financial gains) likely to increase the
potential damage of reputational scandals (ceateris
paribus). This last element enriches the body of
literature suggesting that equity compensation

5. CONCLUSION
The findings provide valuable information regarding
managerial
responses to plausible business
problems involving companies’ reputations, and
these findings are grounded in theoretical
paradigms. In particular, the research addresses the
unexpected consequences which become possible
when
equity-based
compensation
agreements
influence risk-management decisions. Only when
expected personal losses are low (or absent), the
severity of the threat resulted consequential in the
preventing efforts. Furthermore, results indicate that
such behavior could be attributed to the person’s
professional role (when an internal auditor faced a
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packages may increase firms’ risk exposure because
of the executives’ behavioral implications (Martin et
al., 2019; Shaikh et al., 2019; Shi et al., 2019).
Agency theory, lightly touched upon by this
paper, suggests that reputational threats made
known to management can be mitigated by aligning
the personal interests of executives with the
organizations. Usually, goal alignment, the “skin in
the game” mentioned earlier, involves ensuring
agent motivation for the pursuit of opportunity. This
paper’s premise is that this should also be expected
to properly create goal congruence in risk
management. Our findings, created by stipulating
the existence of interests involving equity-based
compensation packages, do not suggest that agency
theory works as expected. Agents, looking at the
prospects of an expensive corporate response that
will impose personal equity losses, favor less
extreme reactions.
Executives mitigate the likelihood of scandal
incidents with corrective actions when the severity
of the threat is high but the likely harm is
inexpensive. When the threat severity is high but
personally “affordable,” proper corrective measures
are accepted. In these instances, gains are earned by
corporate actors by falling into line with actions that
respond to the threat. These gains can be thought of
as shared with investors, whose best interests are
served when a forceful response is made. When the
opposite factors coexist, when preventive costs
exceed personal expected gains, our research
interests are heightened. To some extent, executives
prefer the uncertainty of not adequately attending to
the threat, raising the prospect of an actual scandal.
In fact, the decision cost does not jeopardize the
executives’ incentives, and both investors and
executives seek and earn profits by not responding
more forcefully to reputational threats. The side
effect of not attending to the expensive threat is to
increase the organization’s reputational uncertainty.
Outside investors are likely unaware that current
profits
contain
a
reputational
uncertainty
component promoted by the incentives mechanism
put into place for key agents.
The study evidence also suggests that there is
quite a bit of difference between agreement in the
abstract
and
agreement
when
personal
consequences are involved. We show that when the
stakes are unclear, or when losses are not
quantified, all risks are taken seriously. Stock-option
compensation can be a key element in predicting
corporate responses prior to the scandal’s
occurrence. When executives’ expected personal
losses and their personal wealth are compromised,
they prefer the scenario which is less costly to the
individuals. This implies that the reputational riskbearing behavior is consistent with the overall
business risk attitude under the equity-based
compensation environment (Hoskisson et al., 2017).
We also theorized that the amount of expected
personal losses will trigger a behavioral reaction that
mitigates the likelihood of reputational events.
However, the above-mentioned findings indicate that

internal auditors are much less sensitive to expected
personal losses. The behavior of those individuals
manifested an extremely conservative orientation.
Such behavior sought to inhibit the occurrence of
scandals with the aid of the strongest corporate
response. To say that internal auditors are more
ethical might be an overreaching conclusion, yet it
might be accepted by those who are not highly riskaverse. Thus, internal auditors serve as monitors
who potentially compensate for some of the
uncertainty facing corporations in the form of
reputational scandals.
One could say that this study fails to indicate a
departure from a singular correct strategy. The
essence of reputational threats is that decisionmakers lack enough information to guide them
precisely to a reaction bold enough to suggest
concern and accepted responsibility, yet not
inordinately costly. Circumstances could develop
such that the crisis “blows over” on its own accord,
or through the emergence of countervailing facts.
Less debatable is the fact that, by taking the least
expensive decision, the levels of reputational
uncertainty increase. Less proactivity translates into
leaving more to chance, and hope being substituted
for control. Uncertainty is disliked by markets and,
even if things are not as bad as they could be, this
illustrates a serious misalignment between the
interests of executives and shareholders.
Two major theoretical approaches, behavioral
agency theory, and reputational risk management
collide in the research underscoring the need for
further investigation. The concept that agents who
deal with reputational threats to their institutions
may have conflicts of interest, which potentially
interfere with corrective actions in the best interests
of those institutions, opens a plethora of
investigative opportunities. One suitable research
question is this: “What is the optimal level of
reputational risk that promotes a healthy
environment without compromising growth?” Here
is another: “Is equity-based compensation the
modest alternative to aligning executives’ and
investors’ incentives to mitigate reputational
exposure, or there are better instruments?” Such
questions could be pursued as an extension of our
contribution.
Aside from the restrictions mentioned in the
manuscript, this paper acknowledges the limitations
that exist in experimental research. We ask people to
respond to a hypothetical set of facts, and we are
forced to believe that people take the events we
describe seriously. Our manipulation checks
determined that people understood the situation
presented to them, but that is a relative matter:
people could have misunderstood certain aspects as
well. This paper has a major advantage in that it
accesses people whose work roles match the ones
that we ask them to assume in the study. We also
know that there have been many scandals, many of
them in the industry we use in our hypothetical
scenarios.
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APPENDIX
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT
The pharmaceutical company PharmaWorld Inc. (PHA), No. 9 in the world (about the same size as
Bristol-Myers), is one of the oldest and largest organizations in the world. PHA’s latest development is a male
hair-growing drug without any negative side effects. The drug tests passed the initial clinical trials and are
ready for distribution. The drug requires a special permit to be launched in the market. The U.S. Surgeon
General has not yet granted approval. In the past, 95% of the times drugs were approved, occasional further
testing was required.
In order to generate early revenue to partially offset the huge R&D investment costs while waiting for
the last approval, the drug was pre-launched six months ago in South America, the company’s third-largest
market region, where such approval is not required. Product sales and purchase orders are exponentially
growing.
Your ROLE in this exercise is (CEO/Chief Executive Auditor) of the organization. Your compensation,
like other PHA’s employees, includes salary, stock options, and other employee benefits. Since last year, your
stock options have increased by 20%.
During a recent quality control test of the product, the regional operations manager has reported that a
product run did not meet appropriate quality specifications. A key chemical component from one of the
main Asian suppliers proved defective. The manager estimated that two-thirds of the shipment to South
America, now on the market, is defective.
On a pre-examination, the health-risk department concluded that the defective batch may pose the
following SEVERE REPUTATIONAL THREAT: decreased sexual performance, nausea, headaches, somnolence,
and reduced drug effectiveness for one out of six (low-severity) to 20 (high-severity) patients.
Coincidentally, at the time of this discovery and subsequent analysis of effects, the Board of Directors
was holding a meeting. Out of the available options, ranging all the ways up to a total regional product recall,
the course of action selected was a defective shipment batch recall with no product recall until further
examination. The Board viewed the options as ranging from a total recall to a defective batch recall to no
recall at all. The market risk division estimated that such actions would cause the following financial losses
respectively: 22.5%, 7.9%, and 0.0% decrease in PHA’s stock prices.
For each of the four statements below, select a response from 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 =
disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, and 5 = strongly agree.
 As (CEO/CEA) of the organization, I agree with the Board of Directors’ suggestion.
 Hair loss represents a major concern among males.
 Side effects of drugs are a primary determinant of consumers’ preferences.
 Variations in stock prices reflect companies’ financial performance.
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